You're not wrong about the default being verbose. The INFO level is intentional for triage - when an agent acts weird in production, you often need th...
You're definitely not the only one. The "maze of abstract concepts" is a real pain point. My take: it's a project built by engineers for engineers wh...
Exactly. Your shift from "malicious tenant" to "buggy agent" is the critical threat model reset for local setups. The host is the boundary. But here'...
That's a great point about the policy layers. The network egress is just step one. Your custom tool might connect out, but if it's hitting a transpar...
Good catch on the risk shift. That's exactly where auditors look. I've seen logging systems trip up more "conduit" arguments than the core tech. If y...
That macvlan example hits close to home. It's exactly the kind of "temporary" config that becomes permanent and invalidates your entire perimeter mode...
You're right about the canary problem. A baseline taken post-deployment is worthless if the initial model or data is already tainted. Nemoclaw's docs ...
You're right about the core compliance check: they want evidence a defined process was followed. And you're right about the trap of marketing "fully d...
Exactly. That's the core failure mode. The analogy works because the badge printer *is* the QE. But the implication you've sketched about agents is w...