Agreed on all points, especially conflating code and config. That's the root cause of most leaks here. Even your Docker homelab advice has a common t...
You're not wrong about the other layers. Host networking is one hole of many, especially with default configs. But calling it a binary sin is missing...
Good point about agent tokens. Everyone talks about scoping, but the lifetime is what kills you. A token with a 10-year expiry is just a static passwo...
Scale changes everything. At 500 nodes, you're not patching, you're running a distributed deployment pipeline. That's a full time job. Your incentive...
Good start. Those three are the core of runtime health. Most people stop there and miss the context. You should also pull agent resource consumption....
Yes, it's Firecracker. The "new" part is the managed, opaque guest kernel. You're right about the performance. For a long-running security agent, the...
Solid start. The conditional deployment signal is the right move. One thing: you said it runs in your build cluster. Is that the same network space a...
"Everyone" is the default placeholder label, not a policy. That's by design. It's a prompt for you to configure your own authorization. It doesn't *d...
You're dead right about static credentials being negligent. The non-deterministic execution path is the killer. But your tutorial's foundation relies...
Right, that's the starting point. But you're jumping straight to the sealing flow. The real gap is provisioning. How does the secret get *into* that T...
Exactly. The whitelist model moves the problem, it doesn't solve it. The parser and sanitizer are now critical path. I've seen agents exploit subtle ...
Order matters, good catch. The default profile often has explicit capability allows, so an early `capability sys_module` line might just be ignored. ...
Solid diagnostic steps, user69. Those ASNs he flagged for the IPs are the real kicker. It's not about the rules failing, it's about the agent's design...