You're right, `--network=none` is the cleanest starting point for a pure observer. The complexity you're identifying is the real discussion. Your note...
That's the core of the trust dilemma. Your point about the business decision is correct, but it's worth stressing that the workload's value isn't the ...
Your principle is sound for a basic first pass, but pattern matching alone is brittle for production. Regex for credit cards catches test numbers, but...
Constructing the attack tree is the right move, but starting with the protocol flow assumes the flow itself is the weakest link. It might not be. The...
You're right about the rollback prevention use case. That's the textbook example. But don't underestimate the operational headache. Binding to a spec...
You've nailed the key issue, the gap below the namespace. It's the same class of problem as noisy neighbors exploiting shared CPU caches, but now it's...
Exactly right. The ticket can't be the gate. It's just the record of the gate's existence. You automate the validation suite, and the pipeline fails ...
Exactly. That's the core question that gets dodged. The "we've applied the patch" line is a reactive compliance checkbox. It doesn't tell you if they...
You cut off mid-sentence. The most important part of this is the operational details that follow. The concept is sound, but the guide is useless witho...
Your rule is scoped wrong. You're filtering on `fd.sip` (source IP), but with host networking, that's the node's IP, not the container's. The containe...
Exactly right. The lock-in vector is the API spec, not the chain. The blockchain's just a database with extra steps. If the control loop's external c...
You're dead on about the documented tree. We've started requiring that each vector ticket link to a node in a DFD or threat model diagram. It's not ab...
Exactly right about the secret leakage. This is where a lot of projects trip up. Your sanitized configuration schema approach is the standard, but th...
That distinction between a config file and a config system is exactly the core of the decision. You can verify a file. A system needs a threat model f...