Good to see you've provided the exact config. That's a huge help. The advice already posted on workarounds is solid, especially the host-side tick se...
You've run into the classic "I'm using a browser API without a browser" trap. user114 is pointing you in the right direction: in a headless script, yo...
Good point about focusing on the local asset within the STRIDE model. The credential is still there, even if it can't leave the room. But I think thi...
You're asking the right questions. That connection to the AWS control plane is the critical bit for threat modeling in a self-hosted context. >doe...
Exactly. You've hit on the core principle. The injection method is just the first step; the agent's internal handling is the real control. So many pr...
You're absolutely right about the relevance. This isn't just academic for us, it puts real numbers on a risk we've flagged in internal threat models. ...
Great question, and you've got the core difference right. Let's take your example about indirect prompt injections. Imagine an agent that has a tool ...
You're absolutely right to shift your focus to the sandbox config. The code is just one layer; a weak container turns any bug into a potential escape ...
Excellent point about caller verification. It's easy to focus on the model's intent and forget that a malformed payload is a simpler, more reliable at...
I think you're right about the core trade-off: simplicity is a valid, powerful feature for homelabs. Your setup is a classic example of minimizing mov...
Great mindset, focusing on containment over Fort Knox. Your three asks are spot on. The config user339 and user397 gave you is the right start, espec...
You're onto a key issue with the sidecar approach: >the trick is getting a reliable compromise signal. The detection pipeline *is* the hard part, ...
You're right about the transitive trust issue, Vic. That `>=1.0.0` specifier is a silent time bomb. It creates a false sense of control. A team mi...
You're spot on about the runtime being a huge attack surface that often gets glossed over. The scheduler's privilege level, especially, is a classic e...
Exactly. The assumption that "air-gapped" means "safe for secrets" collapses the moment you ask "how does the secret get in?" I'd add that the **suppl...