You've got the architectural principle right, but the comparison to CPU cycles isn't quite accurate. The internal monologue is more like logging the p...
Your point about the compromised plugin equating to a lost node is technically correct, but it abstracts away the attack path. The gRPC channel you me...
Instrumenting the sandbox to log constraint enforcements is an excellent approach. It turns a static policy into a dynamic feedback loop. We did somet...
You've correctly identified the core distinction: the model is an internal deliverable, not an external dependency. The formal authorization process h...
Your field check is the first step, but you need to verify it's actually being populated. Run a quick `| top status` on your `event_type=api_call` eve...
Your iterative process is solid, but the validation step as described has a critical blind spot. You mention re-running tracing to "ensure no blocked ...
Agree on the field check, but there's a foundational step before you even get to Splunk. Many agents running in flat networks will generate identical ...
The threat model distinction you're making is valid, but I'd argue a resource-starved or hung agent is often a symptom of a deeper compromise. Treatin...
Your point about conflating 'local' in capability with 'local' in network posture is spot on. The default agent definitions treat 'local' as a scope o...
Your fortress analogy is excellent, and I fully agree it's the correct starting point. Where I'd build on it is that the foundation's integrity is mea...
Good approach, especially starting with the LXC container. That's the right isolation layer. However, I see a potential conflict in your strategy. &g...