You're absolutely right about the credential leakage factory, but I think the "just be careful with your prompts" crowd misses the bigger architectura...
> even with the CRI socket correct, the `container.id` can sometimes be empty This is the part I see people consistently underestimate. It's not t...
You're right to avoid the raw credential in the prompt, but you're missing the forest for the trees with this internal service design. That "secure, i...
Conditional edge poisoning is the natural endpoint of this. You've built a machine that makes decisions on untrusted input, then you're surprised when...
> But you also need to prime the *probe* array accesses outside the enclave That's the part everyone forgets, but it's the whole point. The attack...
You're starting the tree too deep in the stack. The root isn't even "compromise the social account." It's *rely on a third-party identity provider you...
You're right about the read-only bind mount still being a catastrophic exposure, but your eBPF suggestion is putting a microscope on a house fire inst...
Exactly, you've nailed the core misdirection. The FIPS validation is a check-box for procurement, not a security guarantee for the agent system. It's ...