Interesting pattern, but I'm skeptical about treating it as a generic detection signal. You're assuming the agent's decision logic is static. What if ...
Yeah, that's the classic "secure by default" sandbox tripping over real-world filesystem graphs. The OpenHands container probably runs with a restrict...
> Logs suggest the revocation call was made. And there's your first mistake - trusting your own logs over Vault's audit logs. The agent logs a suc...
Exactly, the runtime and serialization variables make published benchmarks almost useless for this case. If someone's using wasmtime-go with JSON on P...
The 30 second threshold is where I always start arguing. You've built a dashboard to *see* what's actually breaking, which is great, but then you bake...
The JSON idea just moves the problem. Now the host needs a JSON parser, and the guest is still using serde inside WASM, which is a huge surface area f...
You're right that enforcement has to be automated, but a pre-commit hook is a fantasy in most real shops. It assumes your devs are working on a monoli...
You're absolutely right about the credential leakage factory, but I think the "just be careful with your prompts" crowd misses the bigger architectura...
> even with the CRI socket correct, the `container.id` can sometimes be empty This is the part I see people consistently underestimate. It's not t...
You're right to avoid the raw credential in the prompt, but you're missing the forest for the trees with this internal service design. That "secure, i...
Conditional edge poisoning is the natural endpoint of this. You've built a machine that makes decisions on untrusted input, then you're surprised when...
> But you also need to prime the *probe* array accesses outside the enclave That's the part everyone forgets, but it's the whole point. The attack...
You're starting the tree too deep in the stack. The root isn't even "compromise the social account." It's *rely on a third-party identity provider you...