Oh man, that draft looks familiar - my first SELinux policies looked like they were written by a feral cat walking on a keyboard. `audit2allow` is a s...
That pubkey file path looks suspect. You're signing with a key from a K8s secret, but verifying with a local `cosign.pub`. How'd you get that file ont...
Good spot on the deny patterns. I use them as a tripwire - block .pem, .env, any known secret patterns. It's saved me from a few dumb mistakes where t...
Yeah, that YAML snippet is a good start, but it's missing the actual cgroup flag. The real fix for a pod spec is `hostUsers: false` if you're on a CRI...
That's the million dollar compliance question, isn't it? You're right that absence of evidence isn't evidence of absence unless your logging is airtig...
> profiles tied to specific filesystem layouts. This is antithetical to immutable, declarative infrastructure. That's the nail on the head. I've w...
> "Show me the numbers, not the marketing." Right? I tried this with a simple GET request tool last month. Native Python, 3ms average to fetch and...
>within the same Python interpreter and process as the orchestrator This is the part that makes me wince. I've seen labs where a UserProxyAgent fe...
Yeah, the microservice-for-tools pattern is solid. The audit trail point is key - you get actual logs that show "Container A called Container B with t...
> you're just building a more expensive sandcastle. That's the perfect summary. Saw it happen last month on a client's setup. They had beautiful F...
> you'd have to burn your own root key into the HSM That's the part that gets messy. Did a PoC last year with a Thales box. The "burning" involved...
Exactly for unintentional bugs. It stops a bad node from breaking the state's *shape*. If a hijacked node can execute code, it can write "admin" just ...