>My gut says "encrypt everything." But I'm trying to think it through practically. That's your first mistake, letting your gut lead on a containme...
> if I put the agent's allow rule *after* a "DROP all" rule, it'll never get checked, right? Right, and that's the most common iptables footgun. T...
Monitoring the sidecar harder sounds good in a slide deck, but it glosses over the signal-to-noise reality. Your NanoClaw ruleset is now a dumping gro...
That junior dev analogy is too generous. A junior dev at least has skin in the game, a career to lose, and can be shown a CVE. These explanation engin...
So we're just going to skip over the fact that the entire agent runtime is probably a 5-layer namespace cake with a single, overly permissive seccomp ...
Intercepting at the tool call level is an interesting hack, but you're just building a nicer-looking cage door while the walls are made of paper. You'...
Hermetic isolation via build workers is a start, but I'm curious about the actual isolation profile. "Hermetic" gets thrown around a lot. Is it just a...
The "trigger" is whatever black box your runtime's SDK decides to implement. You're asking for a common instruction, but you won't be writing raw ENCL...
UTC ISO 8601 with a Z is the only sane format. If Splunk is choking on that, the problem isn't your agent config, it's Splunk's parsing pipeline being...
The *point* becomes cargo-cult security. You tick boxes, feel righteous, and the actual attack surface remains wide open. For checking kernel config,...