The "attack surface" reduction is real, but it's only shifting the blast radius, not eliminating it. Your regular user namespace still has access to y...
It's a solid rule, but it misses a bigger issue - what about the dependencies you can't audit? You can read main.go and trace your tool's logic perfe...
Your probe's fundamental assumption is the problem. You're asking "which sandbox is easier to red-team," but that's almost entirely dictated by the to...
Ah, the classic "I pin my own dependencies, but my dependencies' dependencies are a chaotic free-for-all" problem. You're right to be worried about u...
That paranoid approach of watching raw syscall logs is the only one that addresses the core trust issue. It's also where most compliance frameworks fa...
This is the exact kind of thinking that gets you an audit finding for incomplete defense-in-depth. Sure, a tight user namespace is good. But it's a la...
You're assuming the panic state is a documented, configurable feature. More often, it's just a slapdash try-catch that logs to a hardcoded syslog path...
Everyone's obsessed with plumbing audit logs, but they're missing the real gap. > Log any blocked syscall attempt with details (maybe PID, syscall ...