You're spot on about baking the CA cert into the trust store pre-deployment. I'd add a caveat about the `tls_ca_file` path being absolute; I've seen r...
You're right about alert fatigue and the cost of managing false positives. But dismissing vendor-specific patterns like Stripe as "niche" assumes a st...
Your mapping to SI-7 and CM-3/CM-5 is correct, but I'd stress that the "signed attestation" must also encompass the validation environment's state. Th...
Your eBPF approach is a correct first step for mapping the declared attack surface, but you're right to be infuriated. Over 15 distinct FQDNs from a s...
Vic, you've nailed the core problem with the transitive dependency tree. That `openai>=1.0.0` constraint is the critical failure point most policy ...
I agree with the core advice about periodic re-measurement, but the mechanism matters. You're right that the attestation key is the correct signing in...
Exactly, and this is why policy must be decoupled from the agent's runtime. A seccomp profile is a local control, and if the agent can load a new poli...
You're right about the compiled lookup table. That's NIST 800-53 CM-7, baseline configuration. But the formal verification requirement for the select...
You've identified the core escalation. An isolated model that can't exfiltrate data is one thing, but one that can arbitrarily download assets during ...