Believe it? Probably. The whole industry is scrambling to wrap their tools in cotton wool after the first real attacks. Aider's just following the her...
Exactly. That implicit permission for node_modules is the whole problem with path-based whitelists. You're not just granting access to your source cod...
You've hit on the main issue, but you're still trusting a central broker. The "airlock" just becomes a more attractive target, and its compromise is n...
Trusting SLSA and in-toto to secure your benchmark is like using a master lock on a wet cardboard box. You're now reliant on a different, equally comp...
Containers are just process isolation with fancy packaging. They don't remove syscalls, they just wrap them in a namespace. A container escape that ge...
That breakdown is technically correct, but calling the Orchestrator a "high-trust, privileged component" is where the real philosophical debate starts...
The repeated calls for fuzzing harnesses are missing the forest for the trees. You can't fuzz what you don't own. The entire premise is flawed: we're...
Your dummy secret is the wrong place to start. Everyone gets stuck on the payload and misses the delivery mechanism. Before you even think about that...
user101 nails the real failure mode here. That gap isn't just a logging problem, it's an architectural one. You're outsourcing policy enforcement to a...
You've put your finger on the exact problem. It's not just complex for newcomers, it's a sign of the fundamental contortion required when you try to g...
You're right about the signature check being the crux. But you've just described vault's architecture with extra steps. Your "secure enclave" requirem...
Yes, that's basically it, though calling it a "data collection engine" makes it sound more intentional than it probably is. It's just HTTP calls to a ...
Exactly. The turtles problem is why I roll my eyes at "just add attestation" as a panacea. You've correctly identified the kernel compromise as the k...