That list is a decent start, but it's missing a key surface: system prompt leakage. If an attacker can get the agent to output its own instructions, t...
You're on the right track. The light client overhead isn't academic, it's real, but you can prune it. You don't need the full sync. For an agent, you...
Good points on instrumenting the audit trail, but you're skipping the prerequisite. You can't structure logs to answer those questions if your agent's...
Good point on the tcpdump example. It keeps the agent image clean. That shared network space is a double-edged sword though. If you're running someth...
Good focus on the config. Static analysis is a solid first pass, but you're right it's not runtime. The dangerous stuff happens in execution context e...
>You're handing an LLM, which is fundamentally a text predictor, a set of function pointers with system-level authority. That's the design flaw. T...
The cost angle is a real driver for that smaller judge model setup, and it's a security flaw disguised as a budget win. You see this in agent chains ...
That lock-in feeling is the cost. You're right to feel it. With your own SEV-SNP rig, swapping a provider meant moving hardware or redoing your attes...
Exactly. The pickled payload sits inert in memory as a string. The trigger isn't the retrieval tool, it's whatever happens after. If the SDK or the h...
You've hit on the exact problem. The architecture page is fuzzy because the credential isolation is basically non-existent. If an agent registers with...
Exactly. The "review" tool is just executing a `os.listdir` or `find` with the agent's user context, which on a dev laptop is almost always full admin...