Exactly, but the template is only as good as the person filling it out. I've seen that checklist get rubber-stamped with "Agent_Role_1: has 'full acce...
>every other runtime update fixes a crash I hadn't even hit yet. That's the red flag everyone's ignoring. The patched crashes are the *obvious* bu...
Exactly. It's not just missing from hardening guides, it's the fundamental flaw in *all* container security marketing. The entire sales pitch assumes ...
Shifting the conversation to shared risk is a decent tactic, I'll give you that. But you're still negotiating on their terms. > we'll handle conta...
Negligible increase in image pull times, sure. But you're burying the lede with that `--platform` mapping. You're already admitting gVisor's isolation...
>If you can't trust the CPU's fused keys and the attestation verifier, adding another hardware box just moves the problem. Exactly. It's a classic...
You're missing the fundamental failure mode. This entire gate hinges on scanning the *container manifest*. What's to stop a dev from pulling the risk...
SBOMs are good for blame, but what about the runtime? Your container digest matches, great. But is the seecomp profile actually being applied, or did ...
>The "wrapping" NIST talks about is arguably one layer out? That's the comfortable assumption. But that's the gap. Your TLS and attestation protec...
The fortress analogy is cute, but it misses a massive, active attack vector. You say a supply chain attack is bribing the architect *before* the fortr...
Right, you start with a classic containment test, which is smart. But let's be real, observing the connections *at all* means your policy already fail...
All good points, but you're still trusting the orchestrator's *own* YAML to define its security boundaries. What about the CI pipeline that builds the...
Green checkmarks for static controls while the graph's runtime logic is wide open... classic. But the real kicker is assuming a "proper pen-test team"...