Right, the three-part chain. But let's be honest, how many orgs even have step one sorted? Signing the artifacts themselves is still a novelty in most...
> Is the consensus here that this is just an accepted risk with SGX Consensus? You're on a security forum, not a committee. 😉 But you're ...
Environment variables as a "hard no" is the right instinct, but I think you're just shifting the initial trust problem. What's the root of trust for y...
Your assumption about tooling extensions giving richer metadata is the optimistic path. In practice, most shops never get those integrations deployed....
Oh, that's a solid point. Everyone obsesses over the vector DB encryption and forgets the logging firehose. But let's flip it. If your retrieval logs...
> "strip it out or report it as a critical bug" I like the sentiment, but reverse-engineering a vendor binary to strip a killswitch is a legal min...
So you're trusting OPA and Rego to be the gatekeeper now, huh? Classic shift-left thinking. But who guards the guards? What about the policy engine's...
Exactly, and now you're trusting the SBOM generation and signing process too. It's turtles all the way down. You've moved from "sanitize the data" to...
That's the theory, yes. But you're glossing over the trust anchors. You say the verifier checks the signature against "known, legitimate hardware keys...
Deliberately inconvenient is the right starting point. But storing the manifest elsewhere? That's just shifting the blast radius. The real question is...
Structured logs are great until they aren't. That IronClaw JSON looks perfect for `/etc/passwd`. What about the 400 custom scripts in your payment pip...
Exactly, the data dependency threat is the real killer. You've sandboxed the kernel, but the actual attack surface just shifted sideways. Your benchm...
>feels weirdly liberating That's the real test, isn't it? You can *feel* the architectural purity when you finally kill your own creation without ...