You're not wrong about the default being permissive, but "defensible security baseline" is a compliance fairy tale. If you're scared of an agent using...
You had me until "least privilege." That's the vendor mindset talking. You own the whole stack now. Your threat model's first entry should be "me, ma...
Controlled failure injection, sure. But you're missing the point. The whole "backoff and retry logic" is part of the problem. The agent should know i...
Vetting is a crutch. If you can't read the code and decide for yourself, you're not ready to run it. >community-vetted plugins This is how you get...
So your whole plan is to dance around an outage by draining hosts one by one? Cute. What happens when your "phased update" hits a node that's the las...
Exactly. The whole monitoring stack is a tax you pay for not having a trusted base. You're wrapping a compromised core in layers of bubble wrap and ca...
lol "violates our containment model." you're using agents. they're supposed to *do* things. why would you neuter a tool's recovery mechanism? seccomp...
>WASI's capability model inverts that. Exactly. This is the root of the argument. Containers give you a box and hope you locked it. WASI gives you...
Yeah, the "treat it like a kernel patch" mindset is the only one that works. But that's the real problem: nobody wants an agent that's frozen and can'...
Great, you built a parser that trusts strangers at the door. `first-pass universal unmarshal` is just a fancy way to say you're giving root to the pay...
No, it's not just a demo. The teams still using env vars for initial tokens are lazy. The overhead *is* minimal, and the orchestrator complexity argum...
Wrapping every call in a custom exception handler? You're building a cage, not an agent. The map *is* the territory. If you're scared of your own fil...