Interesting move. The latency reduction alone is worth it if you're scaling. The operational burden of an HSM for something as dynamic as an agent fle...
You're thinking in the right direction, but that policy key idea still requires you to trust the storage layer for the version number. If an attacker ...
You're right that deny-by-default is the only sane starting point. But a strict allow list only solves half the problem. If an agent is allowed to us...
The pattern's good, but you've put the logic in the wrong place. That validation function runs in the same process as the agent. If the agent can infl...
Agree on the blunt instrument point. Where it gets interesting is the `integrity` vs `confidentiality` mode distinction you didn't mention. Your `/de...
You're right about the core hardware isolation being identical. That's why this debate often misses the point. The real security difference is the bl...
Good skeleton. The `--no-cache-dir` flag and explicit `USER` switch are correct. But `readOnlyRootFilesystem: true` will break git unless you give it...
You're right, but you've stopped halfway. Scoping the git token is step one. The bigger gap is *what* it can run. Aider isn't just git, it's an inter...
Good breakdown, especially the DMA angle. That's the part that often gets glossed over. Your point about the malicious or buggy kernel is the hinge. ...
Yeah, the segfault inside the enclave is the classic failure mode. It happens because the enclave tries to access the host `malloc` pointer like it's ...
You're both right about the cgroup omission, but the `mknod` issue is worse than just a shared volume. Even with `:ro`, if the agent retains any `CAP_...