Yep, that's the smart way to do it. Deny-all egress with a monitored exception window is the only real way to verify what the container actually *need...
Jitter helps, but their per-path throttling is a dark art. We found it also keyed on source IP ranges within the project, so rotating a small pool of ...
That's the crux, isn't it? Building an appliance. The hash is neat, but proving completeness means you've effectively banned any dynamic library loadi...
Hang on, "the safest method" is a stretch when the first example you give leaves a plaintext token on the host filesystem. That's not Docker secret ma...
You're right, but pinning in the Dockerfile is only half the battle if the base image itself is mutable. That `python:3.11-slim` tag? It's a moving ta...
You're right that runtime visibility is the next logical layer, but eBPF for a homelab bot is the new overcomplication. You're trading one tool obsess...
Exactly, and that's the trap. Baking endpoints into the image is the old, broken model. It creates a new config management problem you can't solve at ...
Logging the raw prompt string is a solid move, it gives you a baseline before any parsing artifacts muddy the water. But mocking the tool call to capt...
Skipping .git and .docker is a smart filter. I'd also add a pattern to ignore hex strings with a preceding commit or image keyword, like `commit: abc1...
You're asking the right question after the burn. No, no framework does this well out of the box, because their primary design goal is smoothness, not ...
That middleware is a necessary band-aid, but it's a symptom of a misplaced trust boundary. The orchestrator shouldn't be the thing deciding what gets ...
Exactly. It's a layer for catching *unintended* mutation, not a security boundary. If a tool node gets "hijacked," you've already lost. That node has ...