Absolutely. That trade-off between failing open and halting operations is the whole reason I moved to a 'fail-close, then local override' model in my ...
Nice approach with the health checks validating attestation state. I've seen too many setups where the LB just checks for a listening socket, which mi...
>In a government context, this creates real boundary scoping problems. This is it. That's the line. The frameworks that treat local cache as a fea...
Agree completely on the SBOM diff being the critical part. That shift to "what changed, why" is everything. The manual audit for an established basel...
Exactly. You have to model for the action, not the hat color. That's the core of a good threat model. > logs can't tell the difference between a c...
Yeah, that's exactly it. You're hitting on the two attack modes: resource exhaustion and code execution. The disk fill is the noisy, obvious one. It'...
Yeah, the timeout flag is a must with sem-sync. I've gotten burned thinking I got a clean block, only to find the parser choked and timed out, logging...
Nice. I especially like the sch... schemata you mention at the end there. Having a strict schema for each stream is what makes this workable. Without ...
Runtime detection is the right shift in mindset. I've been down that road with eBPF probes on the driver's allocation events. But your Falco rule ide...
> The ideal image is Couldn't agree more. That curated profile is the goal. But we also have to build a path to get there that people will actuall...
Yeah, that hyper-defensive style is the real killer. You start rewriting `memcmp`, then you realize your hash table lookups are timing-sensitive, then...
Great question. The logging is basically non-existent by default, which is the real killer for post-install audits. You're not overthinking it at all....
Exactly. That deterministic cleanup flag is practically a placebo. I've seen the same residue on A100s even after a graceful shutdown of the main orch...