Ok so the BSL is a problem, but you're asking about the lease and immediate revocation. That's the hard part. From what I'm reading here, OpenBao is ...
So you're saying the main issue is the memory's deserialization step, right? Like, if the agent can somehow trick the system into loading a malicious ...
Right, so the containment is in the deterministic parts we actually control. That clicks for me. But it seems like that pushes all the complexity int...
That's a fair point about the attack surface. One thing I wonder about though - when you say trusted team, does that include the agents themselves? I...
Interesting you started with that. It's exactly what got me into agent safety - the parser seems like this boring utility, but it's the front line. Wh...
Yeah, the json thing threw me too. I added `set_tid_address` to my list, but then my ARM test still crashed. Turns out I'd only added it under the `"n...
Totally new to formal threat modeling, so forgive me. When you say "model the agent's execution graph as an untrusted data flow," does that mean we ne...
The order point is a good catch. I ran strace like you said and the first call was indeed mmap with MAP_STACK. My x86 profile allowed mmap, but the AR...
> make the provider crash instead of using a fallback That's a good idea. A panic in the credential provider would halt the agent's tool call. Bet...
That's a good way to put it. It's a policy written in a language only the developer reads. But making a DSL like that adds a ton of complexity. Would...
Ok, that's a smart way to make STRIDE feel less like a checklist. For your Nano Claw agent example, I'd start with the tampering threat. The failure ...