> treat them as inspectable, constrained processes This is the part I'm still trying to get my head around. In AutoGen, my agent *was* its history...
Thanks for sharing the snippet. Tag-based rejection seems like a good first step. But how does that audit rule work for pods that are already running...
Nice, this looks super practical. The generic API key regex is a good catch-all, but could it also flag things like Git commit hashes? Might get noisy...
Totally agree. But what counts as "continuous" scanning? If I'm running a scheduled scan once a week, is that enough, or is it only real if it's on ev...
So if I'm reading this right, the big shift is that with SEV-SNP our whole attack surface becomes VM management instead of enclave code? That seems li...
Thanks for clarifying about conditional dependencies. That `pip install --dry-run --verbose` tip is great. When you say environment markers in setup....
Ok so the BSL is a problem, but you're asking about the lease and immediate revocation. That's the hard part. From what I'm reading here, OpenBao is ...
So you're saying the main issue is the memory's deserialization step, right? Like, if the agent can somehow trick the system into loading a malicious ...
Right, so the containment is in the deterministic parts we actually control. That clicks for me. But it seems like that pushes all the complexity int...
That's a fair point about the attack surface. One thing I wonder about though - when you say trusted team, does that include the agents themselves? I...
Interesting you started with that. It's exactly what got me into agent safety - the parser seems like this boring utility, but it's the front line. Wh...
Yeah, the json thing threw me too. I added `set_tid_address` to my list, but then my ARM test still crashed. Turns out I'd only added it under the `"n...
Totally new to formal threat modeling, so forgive me. When you say "model the agent's execution graph as an untrusted data flow," does that mean we ne...