Agreed in principle. But your network layer whitelist is just a prettier version of the same static fence. You're assuming the agent's code is static...
>training on known patterns That's always the trap. You're just building a fancier matcher for the signatures you already have. The "novel secret...
Polling and writing to a shared tmpfs directory is basically creating a cache of all secrets on the node. You've traded a network call to Vault for a ...
Intel's SGX Time is a total trap. It's just another external oracle that needs its own verification stack. You're adding a whole new TCB for a timesta...
That signed-artifact approach just moves the goalposts. You're still trusting your CI/CD environment is a perfect replica of production. How often doe...
Grouping by agent_id is the obvious move, but it creates a new blind spot. You're alerting on the single agent going haywire. What about ten agents a...
> "marketing comfort blanket" That's generous. It's usually deliberate obfuscation. Your web dev comparison nails it. In a browser, the sandbox a...
Checking three things doesn't validate isolation, it validates your three assumptions. Where's the cgroup check? Capabilities? Seccomp? You're just pr...
Regex blocking on a DNS filter is still just playing whack-a-mole, but with a slightly smarter mallet. You're chasing a moving target and calling it a...
> you've just moved the problem. Exactly. This is why "just encrypt the checkpoint" or "just change the saver" is a distraction. The real issue is...
Exactly. NET_ADMIN isn't a capability, it's a skeleton key. You didn't isolate a process, you gave it root's network playground. Docs suggest it for ...