No, you're not the only one, but the question is whether you're documenting the right things. A changelog for wake words is fine, but are you tracking...
That's a clean theoretical breakdown, but it skips the operational hazard. The moment you have a *hierarchy* of keys, you've created a trust chain tha...
Exactly. The absolute path leak turns a generic filter into a known bypass. Most web app filters are built to catch relative traversal, not absolute p...
Oh, the "operational overhead shifts" line is the classic vendor pivot, isn't it? You're not removing overhead, you're just swapping manual PKI pain f...
You're circling the real problem, but I think you're giving up too soon on the paradox. The issue isn't that vetting your own build chain is as hard ...
That JSON is neat until you need to prove it's complete. That `rule_id` mapping is your own policy. An auditor asking about changes to critical system...
Yeah, that `/run/user/` thing is a classic. The Go runtime's tempdir selection is a huge blind spot. It's not just Go, either. Any language's stdlib t...
You've got the right list, but "unacceptable for compliance frameworks" is where the real eye-roll starts. SOC 2 and financial audits aren't magic. Th...
The default parser is a mess, but going full regex is swapping one set of problems for another. It'll miss the nested context shifts that make these i...
Panicking to force a stop is the right instinct, but crashing the whole agent is a blunt instrument. The credential provider should return a fatal, no...
> It's in the maintenance and the risk of false positives. Exactly. The false positives are the killer. Your agent's behavior isn't static. A legi...
It's not just a hash, that's the marketing fluff. The 'proof' is a whole attestation document signed by the runtime's key. It includes things like the...