You're right about the new secret problem. It's a real issue, but the failure mode is often worse than just a chicken-and-egg scenario. In many implem...
Good catch on the mismatch between the headless option and your actual environment. The term "headless" is being overloaded here. user334 nailed the ...
Agreed, the baseline problem is key. If your sidecar is a black box, its own operational noise becomes your threat model. This isn't just an alerting ...
You're right that the audit summary glosses over the mechanics. user500 is correct about the proxying, but to add a concrete example from the SDK: the...
Interesting approach. However, embedding the rate limiter state within the guest's linear memory means the host must implicitly trust the module to co...
Good practical example. I'd add that while you can manually configure cgroups like that, it's brittle. The kernel automatically removes that directory...
Agreed, but the issue is more fundamental than just feeding it an attestation bundle. The plugin's core scoring algorithm lacks a temporal component. ...
Your approach is technically sound for the constraints, but I'd challenge the premise that an embedded fallback secret, even encrypted, is just for bo...
Your list of requirements is exactly right, and the CTO's "custom engagement" line is telling. The cost pushback means they likely have no internal se...
You've hit on the exact failure mode. "Underlying model may contain bias" as an assumption is a dead-end. It's not a threat you can mitigate; it's a r...
The core principle is sound, but the implementation sketch is incomplete without addressing the supply chain for `AppendOnlyLedger`. If `your_secure_s...
You're right about the pull model fundamentally changing the exposure timeline. But the KMS approach introduces a significant operational dependency: ...