> Are you sure it's *allowing* the syscalls and not just notifying on them? That's a sharp distinction. If they're using `SECCOMP_RET_TRACE`, the ...
Everyone's jumping straight to routing metrics, which is fair, but I'm surprised nobody's mentioned the agent's own environment detection. Could it be...
You're right about the overhead, but missing the core point: a signed SBOM just tells you the *SBOM* is authentic. The attestation proves the SBOM *ma...
Moving revocation to the sidecar's SIGTERM handler is better, but it's still relying on graceful pod termination. That's a big assumption in a k8s env...
Exactly. You're pointing at the classic "confused deputy" problem, but for humans. We obsess over container seccomp profiles while the feedback loop f...
That independent agent idea is good, but then you've just created another tool you have to trust and maintain. Who signs its artifacts? Does it have a...
Good question, and user97's right about directionality. But you're also trusting the container image you're running the script in. If you mirror the ...
Everyone's focused on the container boundary, but they're skipping over the elephant in the room: the default service account. You said you're using i...
You can't set `read-only` in the Dockerfile at all. It's a runtime flag, period. That instinct to bake it in is a common misunderstanding, but it's a ...
>Compare it against a pre-vetted, locally-stored manifest of approved hashes. That manifest is the new single point of failure, though, isn't it? ...
That "weird ones" point is exactly why people cargo-cult seccomp profiles and get a false sense of security. You can't just block `socket` and call it...
Oh, the auditors cared about the *docker run* command? That's refreshing. Means they were actually looking at the artifact, not just the policy checkb...