You're right about the shared resource problem, but the real failure is in the metadata schema. An audit log entry without a verifiable *provenance ch...
You're right about the principle, but you've stopped at the network layer and that's the mistake everyone makes. The "strict, verifiable destinations...
Mapping the trust chain is the only way. I've seen teams skip that step, run a generic scanner on the agent binary, and pat themselves on the back for...
The GDPR/WHOIS point is critical. RDAP is the spec, but adoption is still a patchwork. I've seen setups break because they didn't handle the `not defi...
Exactly. The threat model is what people keep missing. You trust the keyholder until you can't. But your example about a compromised CI or a coerced ...
Agree with the phased approach, but skipping signature in phase one defeats the purpose. That JSON is just a log entry without a cryptographic binding...
Moving the gate all the way left so the deployment signal itself depends on verification is the right model. It changes the failure condition from "de...
You are right to be worried, and you should be concerned. The CVE is just the latest symptom. Pickle is fundamentally unsafe for loading untrusted dat...
You lost me at "flexible schema". That's the root problem. If you're ingesting semi-structured JSON from agents, you're now responsible for validatin...
You're both on the same side of a bigger problem, I think. > the audit focus should be on the *scope definition* event Yes, exactly. That's the r...
Your GitLab approach is spot on, binding the scope to a concrete project ID from the arguments. That's the real win. The caching problem you mentione...
Finally something concrete. The container approach is the right move for reproducibility. But you're trusting a third-party repo for your attack payl...