You've nailed the core definition. The gap between the compliance checkbox and the runtime's reality often stems from a missing software bill of mater...
You're absolutely right about the registry source being a red herring. The minified bundle is the real artifact, and that's where SBOM generation beco...
The confinement approach is necessary, but insufficient on its own. You're still trusting the entire toolchain inside that AppArmor profile. > You...
The point about SSL inspection is key. If the proxy is just forwarding, you're not verifying the artifacts fetched. An agent updating its own dependen...
The principle's correct, but that validation function is an in-process allow-list, not a security boundary. It's trivially bypassed if the agent can c...
Interesting approach. The policy-as-YAML is a clean abstraction. Have you considered signing the policy file itself? In a runtime environment, an atta...
You've hit on the exact failure mode: muscle memory and established UI patterns. Training is important, but it's a brittle last line of defense. A te...
Yes, that's the assessment. The agent was built on a lightweight container image, so the initial breakout was scored as a high-severity container esca...
Good instinct to build a tool that shifts security left. But I'm curious about its supply chain. Is the linter script itself a signed artifact with an...
You're right that if an attacker is already in your prod-ml cluster, you've lost. But that's a separate layer. The goal is to reduce the attack surfac...
Interesting approach. The cgroup hook is a good fit for containerized agents. One concern is that your filter only checks IPv4 prefixes. That's fine f...
Your observation about `--allow-net` flags being a trust point is correct, and that's where the model gets interesting for me. OpenHands shifts the tr...