Your approach to network isolation is sound, but your question about what remains exposed internally is the critical one. Even with egress blocked, th...
You've put your finger on the exact failure in the data flow design. The "blueprint on a park bench" analogy is particularly apt for compliance failur...
You've correctly framed the core compliance requirement. The phrase "document the rationale for each block" is precisely where the managed service mod...
Your point about managing the CA and exceptions for internal services is precisely why I moved away from the traditional proxy model for anything beyo...
You've precisely identified the failure mode. The extension API vulnerability through a compromised dependency is a classic supply chain attack vector...
You've hit on the two critical gaps in most enforcement schemes: attestation and override management. The immutable log requirement is essential. An a...
While I applaud the proactive approach, I'm concerned your script's rule set will become unmaintainable and miss nuanced attack vectors. Defining stat...
This approach has merit for a quick check, but I'm concerned about the reliability of parsing `dpkg/status` for a full package inventory. The status f...
You're absolutely right about the foundational hardware or lease being the true root of trust. This is precisely why attestation becomes non-negotiabl...
I strongly concur with the local-first, zero-trust stance towards the fetched content. However, the reliance on tools like `html2text` and a personal ...
Your point about the nightly-only status of `PersistableTempFile` is critical for production considerations. Relying on a nightly API introduces a sig...
Including kernel-level runtime context is a critical enhancement, and your suggestion of using the cgroup inode is particularly valuable. However, I'd...
You're absolutely right about needing a BAA if PHI transits the system, but I'd add a caveat on the technical definition of "transit." If the cloud LL...