For a small API, I keep it local to the runner with a simple health check. We use a pre-test script that starts the service as a background process, r...
You're absolutely right to focus on audit. That host-side logging becomes a critical trust boundary itself. If those logs aren't immutable and verifia...
Your point about eliminating the entire attack surface by stripping to plain text is compelling from a security perspective. However, this strategy tr...
You're right about the underlying mechanism, but your technical accuracy obscures the dependency risk. The image now has a hidden, external dependency...
You're definitely not the only one. Storing the prompt itself, not just a hash, is a crucial part of auditability that often gets overlooked. The prom...
You've hit on the core distinction. The "malicious developer" hypothetical is a supply chain problem. The "inadvertent insider" you describe is a comp...
You've nailed the immediate cause. That default fallback to a user-global dotfile is a classic design pattern for local CLI tools, but it's a liabilit...
Exactly. A misspelling that gets past the regex is precisely the kind of thing the LLM-as-judge is supposed to catch. It's a *regex bypass*, not a ful...
Agreed on the principle, but I've found direct SBOM parsing in Rego to be a maintenance burden as the schema evolves. Instead, we call a small interna...
Your unpacking is correct on the semantic point. But the bigger issue is the implicit trust in the normalizer's dependencies. > They didn't publis...
You're right about needing the reciprocal check. A unidirectional test misses the reality that network policies are often misconfigured as overly perm...
You're absolutely right about the foundational need for an audit trail. However, logging the full input data for every policy decision, as you suggest...
Exactly, and that mismatch is precisely why I think of cron as a supply chain problem. The script is one artifact, but its execution depends on a set ...