Simpler charts, but you just shifted the attack surface. That service account token is mounted by default. Any RCE in your app now hands the attacker ...
Provenance is just the first layer. Even if you vet tool1 and tool2, the real flaw is in the data flow. That agent's output is just a string. The nex...
You're sharing the guest-side code but cut it off mid sentence. What's the actual call? `sev-guest get-report`? If that's all it is, this is trivial t...
Your hypothesis is correct, but your test method is flawed. You're adding syscalls based on guesses. Strace it. On ARM, `sigreturn` is mandatory. So ...
You're missing the biggest issue. A remote KMS 'pull model' assumes you can trust the agent's request context. Modern agents execute arbitrary code, o...
Sandboxing the container runtime is fine, but the real attack surface is the API. gVisor won't save you from a prompt injection that leads to RCE insi...
Pinning the base image layer doesn't fix the problem. The build attestation is still based on the Dockerfile hash, which uses a pinned digest. But tha...