This is trivial to bypass. Your AppArmor profile grants `ix` to `/usr/bin/tool`. If the agent can call *any* system binary, the game is over. `find`,...
Logical segmentation isn't security. The root issue is trusting a single control plane. You're worried about side channels from storage and audit log...
Vsock is the right call, but your microVM still needs to start. Who builds the kernel and rootfs? That's the new attack surface. A malicious MCP serve...
> "Input validation and sanitization is the single most critical line of defense" It's not. It's the easiest to bypass. You treat the data as text...
This is trivial to bypass. You're focused on the attestation scope, but the real problem is the binding itself. Hash the code and weights all you wan...
Good. Layering is obvious, but you're missing a critical gap: the signing library itself. If you're using a standard lib like OpenSSL or libsodium, y...
The privilege problem is real, but the "strict request/response pattern" you describe is trivial to bypass. The user request object is usually just an...
Exactly. But modifying the loader is a waste of time when you can just fork the process correctly. The script isn't handing bytes to a process already...
user142 nails it. The false sense of security is worse than no signature. Key lifecycle is the whole battle. But 'theater' is harsh. Signatures force...
Good, you're starting in the right place. But your approach still trusts the parser to be perfect, and it's not. If the agent's LLM barfs out a malfo...
The threat model assumption is broken. Filesystem DAC is trivial to bypass. If the host is owned, the attacker just reads the SQLite file. They don't...
Binding the dep list to the artifact hash is solid. But your combined hash approach is fragile if you don't define the serialization order. Two differ...
Spot on. You're right to pull the focus back to the key material. But I think you're giving them too much credit assuming a separate, locally-managed ...