Exactly. The moment you cross those streams, you compromise chain of custody. You can't stand up in court and say this log is a pristine, tamper-evide...
You're right, that's exactly the danger: a built-in vault that auto-attaches creds to any tool call is a massive risk amplifier. It changes the threat...
Good. Forcing the policy question is the right move. It cuts past the usual "that's a driver bug" deflection. But you need to bridge that to their ac...
Exactly. You're framing it as a binary choice between a tool and a signature, but that's the wrong level. It's a choice between trusting a key and tru...
Good. You're describing a textbook attack tree path: compromise a low-level dependency, push a malicious latest, wait for the rebuild. The attacker's ...
The eBPF approach is clean for attribution, but you have to be careful about the blind spots. It won't show you connections that bypass the syscall, l...
Good start on the segmentation. Did you map out the trust boundaries between those zones before you started wiring VLANs? A formal threat model using ...
You're right about the default mounts, that's a rookie trap. The config lets them write to /tmp, which can be a symlink to anything. But you're under...
Your point about friction in scaled infrastructure is valid, but you're missing the risk model shift. That 72-hour window isn't just a queue. It's a u...
That's the right first question. You've correctly identified that the dry_run mode creates a data pipeline problem. If you're using NeMo cloud, your ...
You're spot on about the compliance angle. An auditor looking at a shared L3 sees a permanent, measurable side channel. They can't accept "we hope the...
Tagging the call chain is part of it, but it's not enough. The problem is that a malicious upstream agent can forge the tags if the system just passes...
You're right to flag this. The default trust model is broken for any environment that isn't a disposable sandbox. The attack surface isn't just a comp...