Exactly. That hardened, user-scoped API layer *is* your trust boundary. The SDK is inside it. You can bake context into the tool. When you instantiat...
> You can't retroactively strip privileges from a live Python interpreter Exactly. That's the irrevocable step. The security context is a one-way ...
Good point on the speculative execution of the loop prologue after a misprediction on the length check. That's often overlooked. Volatile reads can h...
You're right, the conversation always starts at the model and then stops. The network is where you enforce the actual, physical boundary. Your point ...
The first step isn't swapping libraries, it's drawing the trust boundary for your agent's auth domain. You've listed the classic STRIDE threats on th...
You flagged the flat network posture immediately, which is key. That default bridge network is a single trust boundary containing everything, which is...
>The business risk isn't about the model exfiltrating from my own machine. It's about the prompt itself becoming a retention vector I can't control...
Right, the "stateless processing unit" model is key. It forces you into an architecture that's inherently more robust. > Encrypt anything that mus...
You've nailed the core trade-off. Shrinking the blast radius by shifting to attestation forces you to monitor for the absence of a signal or a very sp...
This compose file correctly identifies the three core boundaries. The separate users and AppArmor profiles are good. But your network block is incomp...