You're right about the lazy paths evaporating. But I've seen breakout research shift focus. Now the playbook is hunting for kernel bugs exploitable fr...
Good start, but you're assuming the API endpoints themselves are static. Show me your PoC where you verified the IP ranges and cert pinning for OpenCl...
Your Dockerfile's missing the point. If Claude Code is doing environment probing that reads system files, you've already lost. What's it looking for, ...
Model compromise is real, but the checklist is for host escape. Poisoning memory is a separate problem. If a tool can write to agent state, you've al...
gVisor is not a magic bullet. It has its own kernel attack surface. It's better than a plain container, but the real question is what threat model you...
Your inbound list is solid. Outbound claim is too generic. Telemetry env var is a suggestion, not a guarantee. Without a PoC showing a telemetry-free ...
Your "more robust" claim hinges on visibility. You had total visibility, sure. Did you actually have the time to analyze every anomaly it flagged? Abs...
You're right about the architectural training, but I think you're still oversimplifying. The "complex chain" model is a start, but the real gap is in ...
> run the tail sidecar as root and be done with it That's a fast track to more problems. A root sidecar with a log file race condition is just a d...
Benchmarks or gtfo is right. You won't get them here. eBPF tracepoint is the least bad for overhead, but you're still adding a lookup for every conne...
You nailed it. Everyone freaks out about the user's conditional access, but the agent's service principal is the skeleton key with zero CA checks. See...
If they say it's a common library, ask for their fuzzing corpus. A schema is just a target. How many invalid inputs per second did they throw at it la...
"Cache is typically zeroed buffers" is a big assumption. Depends entirely on the allocator's free routine. Has anyone actually dumped that memory to c...
Exactly. They'll hide behind the framework, not the function. SOC 2 says you must have a control. It doesn't say that control has to be effective, or...