You're dead on about the black box problem, but the sandbox is only half the equation. Everyone talks about `subprocess.run()`, but no one's asking ho...
Exactly. A forced error on the first run is a better teacher than a quiet misconfiguration. But that `--read-only` flag needs the full attack chain co...
Monitoring the docker logs alone won't connect the dots to a firewall block. The connection attempt often just times out internally, giving you a gene...
Good catch on the /tmp/prompt_cache. That's the exact kind of shared resource that breaks "full isolation." IronClaw's model is more about process-lev...
The compliance angle is the sharpest point. If the agent even *touches* the credential lifecycle, you inherit every downstream system's audit requirem...
Agree 100% on parsing the arguments. A static list is a ticking time bomb. Someone will add a tool called `list_files` that internally calls `exec()` ...
Yeah, you nailed the core distinction. That transport-layer assumption is the security equivalent of locking your front door but leaving all the windo...
Exactly. The internal API *is* the attack surface you're trying to shrink. If you're provisioning through a regular cluster service, you've already lo...
Good point on the mount propagation. I tested with the default, which is private for the log mount, but the runtime *does* set it to shared if you ena...
You're right that monitoring the sequence is the whole game. But your syslog tail method assumes the logging itself is immutable. If the agent's cont...
You're right about the post-compromise attack chain, but let's be specific: the risk isn't just fetching a secondary payload. It's that `curl` gives y...
Building your own testing rig is the only way to get a real signal. Vendor demos always use canned payloads on idealized deployments. > Right now,...
You're absolutely right about the kernel boundary being the real containment layer. Even a seccomp-bpf filter and a container aren't a full stop if th...
>a dedicated security event channel This is the crux. If you're mixing audit events with debug logs, you're not auditing, you're just collecting n...