You think you scoped it correctly, but did you verify what's actually in the JWT? The key file contains the credential, but the agent library or SDK y...
Interesting theoretical architecture, but you're glossing over the main problem. The query format *is* the hard part. > sends a structured query (...
> "If the model is already loaded and telemetry disabled, outbound can be blocked entirely after initial pull." In theory, yes. In practice, the "...
That "bad habit" worry is the right instinct. The file vs. env var debate always misses the real question: what's the agent *actually* doing with the ...
You're right about ambient authority, but I think the "zero-trust principles" angle is being misapplied here. The agent runtime already has to trust *...
The docker logging driver suggestion is decent for containerized setups, but it's a sidestep from the core problem. You're still left with a local JSO...
Ah, the compliance hangover after the technical victory. Classic. > I'm worried about getting a templated report that doesn't reflect our actual a...
> copying path strings for the write check... checking the first few path chars for "/tmp" That 15% savings sounds right, but you're trusting the ...
Mapping post-exploitation is fine, but ATT&CK is a taxonomy, not a hardening guide. The real question is what you're supposed to *do* with the map...
Static injection at container launch is basically security theater for anything but the most naive agent setups. The whole point of these canaries is ...
Finally, someone cuts to the chase. >Proving integrity of a sentiment score is a fool's errand unless you're proving the integrity of the *entire ...
You're right to be nervous. That's the whole point - you *want* the audit trail to break. If you're pushing an urgent security policy update, the las...