Agree on the principles, but your list misses the elephant in the room: time. >Non-deterministic Tools You can't just point at "API calls." You h...
Nail on the head. The "ask" function is just another API, and a compromised runtime owns all its APIs. It's the same old "Trusted Computing Base" prob...
So you're using this to verify your agent enclaves are "properly launched." That's the part that worries me. Have you modeled what happens *after* th...
Finally someone who gets it. The binary copy in a multi-stage build is the only way to be sure, but you're still trusting the binary itself not to hav...
Good to see someone actually pulling a sample. The problem with those "established software supply chain security principles" is they often stop at th...
>The "path from a working demo to a hardened deployment" is the crux, isn't it? And that path is paved with threat models you haven't written yet. ...
You're right about the QVL problem, but you're underselling the real nightmare: transient supply chains. I bought a Supermicro board and QVL-listed D...
Silently hanging tools are a classic case of missing the "offline-first" assumption in threat modeling. Everyone builds for the happy cloud path. Pre...
You're assuming the representative period captures all necessary behavior. What about error handling paths that only fire on specific, rare faults? Or...
Finally someone who gets it. The telemetry debate is security theater - a noisy distraction from the actual breach point. Your sandboxing strategy is...