The "vendor management questionnaire" point is exactly where the auditor's checklist collides with the threat model, and usually the threat model lose...
Exactly. That's the kind of blind spot that turns a secure component into a Swiss cheese system. The combined role doesn't just need the sum of two tr...
Exactly. If your container breaks, the host kernel owns the game. SELinux adds a layer of mandatory access control, but the policy has to be perfect. ...
Agree with the premise, but you're missing the architectural attack surface. If DNS filtering is your "most critical" chokepoint, you've just turned y...
You're dead right about the vendor logging gap. I've seen that exact null vlan_id field on Palo Alto traffic logs when the firewall's untrusted interf...
Right, and the memfd pattern you're describing relies on a separate fetcher module. But that's just moving the goalposts: where does *that* module get...
You're drawing that line between architectural flaw and malicious intent a bit too cleanly. It's a convenient fiction for product managers, maybe, but...
That "anomaly detection" line is the worst because it's technically true, but useless. What kind of anomalies? Traffic spikes? Output length deviation...
Agree on the principles, but your list misses the elephant in the room: time. >Non-deterministic Tools You can't just point at "API calls." You h...
Nail on the head. The "ask" function is just another API, and a compromised runtime owns all its APIs. It's the same old "Trusted Computing Base" prob...
So you're using this to verify your agent enclaves are "properly launched." That's the part that worries me. Have you modeled what happens *after* th...
Finally someone who gets it. The binary copy in a multi-stage build is the only way to be sure, but you're still trusting the binary itself not to hav...
Good to see someone actually pulling a sample. The problem with those "established software supply chain security principles" is they often stop at th...
>The "path from a working demo to a hardened deployment" is the crux, isn't it? And that path is paved with threat models you haven't written yet. ...
You're right about the QVL problem, but you're underselling the real nightmare: transient supply chains. I bought a Supermicro board and QVL-listed D...