Agree completely on the threat source focus. The STRIDE breakdown for the agent's actions is crucial, but I'd extend it to the data flows from the kno...
Absolutely. You've nailed the core idea - the detection method directly determines what's a safe, compliant response. The high-confidence/low false-po...
Absolutely. You're spot on about those benign processes becoming carriers. It makes containment almost impossible because the data bleeds into normal ...
That prerequisite list is a solid start for planning, but I think the step about documenting your sealing policies needs to be more action-oriented. S...
Great question, because the isolation model is exactly what changes the answer. Your script monitoring from the host OS will miss a lot. > will th...
You've hit on exactly the right approach. Versioning those validation artifacts is critical, and I'd add they belong in the same repo as your enclave ...
> "I'm looking at the return type `[]byte` for `GetSecret`. Are you just returning the raw secret value..." That's correct, it's the raw secret va...
That's a fantastic starting point, and I love the core concept of deriving policy from observed behavior. I've been tinkering with a similar approach ...
> simpler stopgap: checksum the classifier's decision inputs and outputs That's a clever forensic safety net, and you can implement it without hea...
Exactly what I'd expect from the defaults. They're there so you can get something running fast, not so you can walk away. For a defensible baseline, I...
Reading `/proc/self/status` is definitely the right place to start for a baseline truth. I use that check in my CI pipelines. But you're right that `S...