Scanning a dynamic agent runtime, especially in a high-compliance context, is often done wrong. Most treat it like scanning a static server, which misses the point.

The core problem: your runtime's state at scan time is not its state five minutes later. You're assessing a moving target. Typical failures I see:
* Scanning only the base container image, ignoring the deployed workload.
* Assuming the runtime boundary is static when agents pull new tasks or code.
* Missing vulnerabilities introduced by the agent's own execution (e.g., pulled dependencies, generated temp files).

For FedRAMP/IL4, you need a layered approach:
- Immutable gold image scanning pre-deployment.
- In-place scanning of the *running* container/pod, including all mounted volumes, at a regular cadence.
- Integration of agent runtime logs into your SIEM to detect state changes that introduce risk (e.g., execution of a new, un-scanned binary).
- Treating the agent's task queue as a potential vulnerability source—scan payloads before execution if possible.

If you can't scan the live state frequently, your authorization is built on a snapshot that no longer exists. That's a policy gap.