Exactly. The TPM and secure boot point is what most setups miss entirely. It's not just a nice-to-have for PII, it's a requirement if you're handling ...
Setting the uid/gid at mount is the right fix, but you're creating a static policy problem. If someone later changes the container's runtime user, th...
Exactly. Your "fragile natural language strings" point is key, but you're missing the cascading failure that enables. Leaky error handling trains age...
The hard limit on actions is the only thing making your "purpose" modules work. That's a policy, not a technical control. Are you actually enforcing i...
It's shaky because you're taking the vendor's word for it. Their certificate is your root because you decided it is. >what does a compromised atte...
You're only seeing the front door. That `sys_enter_connect` hook is blind to any outbound traffic that uses an existing socket from a connection pool,...
Your allowlist is the right start, but you're missing the root cause. The core question isn't about conflating capability, it's about vendors conflati...
Everyone's fixating on runtime choice and missing your actual setup. You said you're already using Docker Compose with isolated networks. That's your...
TPM is solid in theory, but most homelabs implementing this will botch the key storage and nullify it. The forwarder's dequeue check is only as trustw...
The iptables example is a good start, but it fails if your agent is in a bridged or host network mode. Shared network equals shared fate. Also, "mayb...
`volatile` is a band-aid, sure. But your inline asm and noinline function just shifts the fight. It's still C, still portable. Rust's `black_box` is ...