We're evaluating a vendor-hosted agent platform for some lightweight automation tasks. Nothing sensitive, but it does process internal helpdesk tickets.
This week we hit a bug where the agent would timeout on certain API calls. Vendor support says they can't reproduce it and wants us to send the full execution logs from our last 10 runs for debugging.
The logs contain:
* Full text of the tickets the agent read
* Internal server hostnames and IPs it connected to
* API keys (redacted, but the endpoints are visible)
* Our prompt templates and the raw LLM responses
This feels like handing over a significant slice of our internal context. Their support agreement says they'll "handle all data per their privacy policy," but that's pretty vague.
I'm pushing back, asking for a way to sanitize the logs or for them to provide a local debugging tool. They're insisting it's "standard practice."
So my questions:
* Is this actually standard for hosted agent services? What's a reasonable redaction line?
* If we sanitize hostnames and specific data, are the prompt templates and logic flows still a risk? That's basically our agent's "brain."
* At what point does the operational burden of managing this back-and-forth outweigh the risk? I'm already spending more time on this than it would take to run the agent locally.
For context, we're using their cloud because the initial setup was trivial. But now I'm looking at our self-hosted OpenClaw test box and wondering if the control is worth the effort.
-- Ray
Self-host or die.
It's standard to ask for logs, but never for full context like that. A reasonable redaction is to strip all your internal data and replace it with consistent placeholders. The endpoints themselves might be necessary for debugging routing issues, but not the specific hostnames or IPs.
Your prompt templates and logic flows are absolutely a risk. That's your IP and operational model. If they need to debug the agent's execution, they should accept a sanitized trace of the function calls and timings without the actual content.
Their "standard practice" line is lazy. If their platform can't isolate their code's behavior from your data, their debugging tools are insufficient. Push harder for a local diagnostics module or a guided session where you feed it data in a controlled way.
Authz > Authn.
Totally agree about the placeholder approach. I've had to do this for a few vendors and it's a great filter for what's actually needed.
If they need to trace routing, `INTERNAL_API_1` and `SERVICE_ENDPOINT_A` work just as well as your real hostnames. The patterns matter, not the specifics.
One caveat though: sometimes the bug *is* in how their code handles specific data shapes, like a particular ticket format. In those cases, I'd mock up a fake ticket that reproduces the structure but uses totally nonsense placeholder content. That usually satisfies their debugging without exposing anything real.
Their request for prompt templates is a hard no, though. That's the recipe.
Hardening is a hobby, not a job.
That's a solid point about the data shapes. I've run into a similar case where the bug was triggered by a specific JSON nesting depth from our internal API. A mocked payload with the same structure but lorem ipsum values was enough for them to spot the parser error.
But it makes you wonder: if their platform is so sensitive to input structure, shouldn't their threat model include that as a potential injection vector? The line between a bug and a vulnerability gets pretty thin there.
Model it or leave it.
You're right to push back on sending the full logs. It's not a standard practice, it's a standard *request*. The difference matters.
You've hit the core tension: they need data to debug, but you need to protect your operational context. The placeholder/mock data approach mentioned above is the correct path. For the timeout, they likely need the sequence of calls and response sizes/timings, not the actual ticket text.
Your prompt templates are the crown jewels. Sharing those would be like giving them the blueprint for your automation. A sanitized trace showing "PromptTemplateA called, 1200ms, timeout at Step 3" should be sufficient for any vendor worth their salt. If it's not, that's a red flag about their platform's observability.
The real question is whether this becomes a recurring support pattern. If every bug requires handing over internal context, the operational burden is too high. I'd make agreeing on a sanitization format a condition for continuing the evaluation.
Model the threats before the code.
Oh, that "standard practice" line is such a tell. It's standard for *them* because it's the easiest path, not because it's necessary.
For the redaction line, I'd go beyond hostnames. Any internal identifier, URL, or data string gets replaced with a structured placeholder. Keep the JSON schema, HTTP status codes, and timing data. That's often enough to spot a timeout pattern. If they argue, ask *exactly* which field values are critical for debugging the timeout - they usually can't specify.
> are the prompt templates and logic flows still a risk?
Yes, absolutely. That's your IP and your security model. A sanitized trace showing "called internal API X, got 200, 2.3s, then prompt Y processed for 1.8s, timeout at step Z" should be sufficient. If their platform can't debug from that, they have a visibility problem.
The real burden starts when you're spending more time sanitizing logs than using their product.