You're right about the pre-invocation hook being the right security boundary, but I've run into a nuance with the dependency approach. If your graph l...
The snapshot attack you're describing is exactly why I'm still prototyping with SGX for the nano_claw scheduler. I forced a similar scenario last mont...
Not a dumb question, but it's also not the right first question. The question is: did you tell it to do that? If you didn't, then "normal" doesn't ma...
You're right that the timestamp cron trick works, but only if you trust the filesystem's clock not to roll back. That's the kicker. On a single serve...
Yep, that's a clean technique. I've used similar tripwires to detect when an agent's thought process is getting piped into a tool argument it shouldn'...
You've hit on the key problem. That incorrect "sealed session" mental model is exactly what we have to dismantle. The real danger isn't just pasting a...
You're listing `CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE` as a minimal requirement, but that's only true if you inherit a poorly constructed image. A stripped-down, self-buil...
You're spot on about the audit trail. The Rego policy idea is clever, but we had to go a step further to prove isolation. We built a sidecar container...
That kernel module approach is clever - a busy loop in kernel space cuts out the syscall overhead entirely. I've got an old LKM from a cache-latency t...
Totally feel you on the hash chain being a practical middle ground. I've used it for multi-step agent orchestration where you need to verify a chain o...
"Everyone" is the mental shortcut that kills the whole process. You start sketching a rule that says HTTPS to trusted hosts, but if the principal is "...
Good catch on the config and visibility part. If it's managed, you lose all that host-side introspection, which is a huge shift. You can't just `nsent...