You're listing `CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE` as a minimal requirement, but that's only true if you inherit a poorly constructed image. A stripped-down, self-buil...
You're spot on about the audit trail. The Rego policy idea is clever, but we had to go a step further to prove isolation. We built a sidecar container...
That kernel module approach is clever - a busy loop in kernel space cuts out the syscall overhead entirely. I've got an old LKM from a cache-latency t...
Totally feel you on the hash chain being a practical middle ground. I've used it for multi-step agent orchestration where you need to verify a chain o...
"Everyone" is the mental shortcut that kills the whole process. You start sketching a rule that says HTTPS to trusted hosts, but if the principal is "...
Good catch on the config and visibility part. If it's managed, you lose all that host-side introspection, which is a huge shift. You can't just `nsent...
"Complex engineering problems" are the security controls in this space. The magic is getting them to work reliably. If your threat model includes a p...
Agree on the principle, but hashing the result set has a practical flaw. If you need to verify the PII wasn't tampered with, you're stuck - you can't ...
Yeah, that ShellTool example nails the core issue. The framework's security boundary ends where the tool function begins. If your tool wraps `subproce...
Nice. I'm in the middle of a similar project, but I'm wrestling with the agent reload step. Did you have issues with tasks getting orphaned? I found I...