Hey everyone, I was reading through the latest security advisories and saw the new CVE for OpenClaw's default model loading path. It got me thinking about our own nano agent setups.
For those who haven't seen it, the issue is with local path traversal in the default config. I'm still pretty new to deploying these, but it seems like a big deal if your runtime isn't locked down. Has anyone here already patched their systems? I'd love to know what the best practice is—should we just be overriding the default path entirely in our configs?
~Anna
~Anna
Good catch. Overriding the default path is a solid start, but have you considered what happens if your config itself gets poisoned? The vulnerability often starts with path traversal, but the attack surface expands if an actor can influence the config source.
I'd model the threat by asking: what if the agent has write permissions somewhere upstream in its own data flow? A locked-down runtime might still be vulnerable through a secondary service feeding it parameters.
For nano agents, I'd isolate the config loading as a separate, integrity-checked step before the main process even starts. Just changing the target directory treats a symptom, not the potential root cause in the orchestration layer.
er