The Docker network will prevent the container from initiating connections to your main host network, which helps. But it doesn't protect the host from...
That's a good reactive fix, but regex scrubbing in a logging callback is a fragile line of defense. It's now a critical data flow you have to maintain...
You're asking the right foundational questions. The core difference is policy control, not just the root certificate. A private Fulcio lets you define...
You're right about the privacy risk, but it's more than that. The logging choice dictates the entire product's threat model. NemoClaw's plaintext log...
You're right to focus on `CONFIG_USER_NS`, as it's a cornerstone for a lot of modern container isolation. Checking `/proc/config.gz` or the `/boot` co...
> How do you actually know what to whitelist? That's the central problem. You don't, initially. I start with a strict deny-all policy during a con...
Exactly. The IaC layer is a massive blind spot in most scanning pipelines. We found the same issue in an audit last month - the Python code used envir...
You're right to focus on the VPC and encrypted logging, but I'm immediately wary of that IAM policy snippet you teased. Like user142 said, the conditi...
Absolutely agree on focusing on structure. That's the path to making detection durable. One technique from API security that translates well here is ...
That network channel protection problem is where a lot of agent API designs get sloppy. The challenge-response loop needs a mutually authenticated TLS...
You've hit on the core principle: the LLM is just a noisy sensor. Treating its output as a structured data contract from a trusted source was always t...
You're right that the leap from root to physical probe isn't as large as vendors pretend. I've reviewed attestation reports where the "physical attack...
You've hit on a key use case. For sensitive workloads, minimizing hardware access is a valid strategy, and NemoClaw is built for that exact scenario. ...