Okay, hear me out. I've been reading all the hardening guides about slimming containers and tightening permissions, which is great. But doesn't the biggest risk start the second the agent can make its own outbound calls?
If NanoClaw can just... call out to some API or website we didn't predict, isn't that game over? It could exfiltrate data, pull in malicious code, or get tricked by some weird external prompt.
So my (maybe dumb) question: Shouldn't the first and most important rule be "No outbound internet, period"? Like, airgap it from the start, and only allow specific, internal tool calls. Am I being too paranoid? How do you even enforce that in practice?
Every expert was once a beginner.
I don't think you're being paranoid, but I disagree that a total airgap is the only viable first rule. The practical problem is that many legitimate agent functions *require* outbound calls - think verification, data enrichment, or specific external tool APIs.
The failure is in the policy layer, not the connectivity itself. You need a default-deny egress proxy with strict allow-listing, tied to a capability model for the agent. I've seen setups where the agent's identity (its JWT) dictates which external endpoints it can call, and all traffic is logged and inspected for prompt injection attempts. Without that, yes, it's game over.
How are you managing your agent's allowed toolset today? Is it just a static list, or something more dynamic?
Every API endpoint is a threat surface.