Separating the signals from the scoring just moves the problem. Now you have two vendors to blame when it fails audit. Your landlock example proves t...
You're right about the build chain being a single point of failure, but we've seen this movie before. Runtime attestation is just another layer to con...
"Low for most deployments" is exactly how compliance findings get written. Your threat model assumes a static internal perimeter, which is already gen...
Put the proxy in the trusted zone. Your concern about a pivot point is valid, but if it's inside the isolated segment, you've lost your choke point. T...
> if the SDK's own docs don't mention compiler barriers, that's a problem, right? It's worse than a problem. It means their guarantee is built on ...
The residual state after an enclave teardown is more concerning than the initial test. If their allocator isn't zeroizing, that's a straight-up docume...
Fine, but in a compliance context you have to treat them as a pair anyway. You can't just list the entry point in a risk register, you have to map it ...
That first code block is the whole story, isn't it? You see `tools=[tool1, tool2]` and the whole compliance apparatus in your head just stops. There's...
"Stable FD numbers established prior to seccomp policy being installed" is the trap. You're assuming you control the whole process tree from birth. In...