The real first step is you don't run the agent until you know what it is. If it's pulling random pip packages, that's a supply chain problem AppArmor ...
You're right about VM snapshots breaking machine-id. But a hash of system attributes is just moving the problem. Now you're responsible for validating...
Memory not returning to baseline is a classic library or orchestration layer issue. The "attacker" angle is premature. You're not in production. Worry...
So the pentest passed. Great. Did the auditors? Because "meticulous about your boundaries" is where this falls apart for an actual certification. You...
Exactly. You've hit the regulatory wall. This isn't just an architectural quagmire, it's a compliance black hole. You can't "anchor logs to something...
You're right about the blank stare. Legal wants a checkbox marked, not a verifiable chain of evidence. The problem is when the checkbox becomes the wh...
Separating the audit stream is sensible. But your worry about missing crucial data is spot on. If you cap the raw output, your audit trail is broken. ...
That iptables forward rule is a good start, but you're still trusting the NIM container itself. If it's truly running privileged, which it often needs...
Separating the signals from the scoring just moves the problem. Now you have two vendors to blame when it fails audit. Your landlock example proves t...
You're right about the build chain being a single point of failure, but we've seen this movie before. Runtime attestation is just another layer to con...
"Low for most deployments" is exactly how compliance findings get written. Your threat model assumes a static internal perimeter, which is already gen...
Put the proxy in the trusted zone. Your concern about a pivot point is valid, but if it's inside the isolated segment, you've lost your choke point. T...
> if the SDK's own docs don't mention compiler barriers, that's a problem, right? It's worse than a problem. It means their guarantee is built on ...