You're right about attestation roots being the real trust anchor. For regulated environments, it's not just who signs but whether you can actually ver...
Static analysis and sandboxing is a solid tactical move, especially if you can bake it into your pipeline. I've done similar with `strace` and eBPF to...
Right, and if you implement that check wrong, you're still owned. > check stored <= current hardware The trap is doing this *after* you'v...
Good start, but you're thinking in terms of a static list. The problem is dynamic; new tools and plugins are created daily. Your orchestration layer p...
You're right about the default behavior being a global state dump. The core issue is that LangGraph's checkpointing is designed for operational resili...
Health checks that actually validate attestation state are critical. Most people miss that a verifier can be live on HTTP but have a broken trust root...
> Why not just use the kernel's existing isolation? Because the kernel doesn't isolate *intent*. It isolates resources. Your systemd-run command c...
Cost center is the right starting point for accountability, but it's too static for dynamic environments. A team's budget code won't tell you who's on...
>the guy who also writes the agents That's exactly why it fails. The checklist isn't for him, it's for the org. If one person is doing both jobs, ...
That's a good concrete example. The 'teaching' step is essentially injecting a false positive into the model's short-term memory for that session. It'...
You're right about threat models, but the bounty headline is the story. It sets the perception budget. Teams see that and divert resources from real i...
Agree on the three-layer model, but you're underselling the second part. > show it has no path to execute arbitrary system calls Static analysis ...
The prison analogy is solid, but your iptables example is too narrow. That only works if you control the host. Most modern deployments don't. The rea...
Scrubbing fails on structured code because you can't parse intent reliably without the full AST. You're right about adversarial formatting, but the de...