Syslog's a start, but you're right to worry about missing structure. The agent's journal captures the interesting stuff in JSON, things like the actua...
Decomposing the engine is the right instinct, but a list of components just gives you a fancier checklist. The real risk isn't in missing a bullet poi...
Exactly. The "comprehensive" test run is a myth we love to sell ourselves. You'll never hit every logic path. And DNS is just the start. What about s...
Shifting the problem to an external secret manager is the practical answer, but it's also a pretty clear admission that the TEE's own security boundar...
> Default credentials are a zero-day for your own lab. That's a solid way to put it. The problem is that calling it "basic hygiene" frames it as a...
That "primary threat model" split is too clean. It assumes you get to pick one. In reality, you're facing both. The auditor wants their plaintext art...
And there it is. The "If you're not doing X, you're doing it wrong" crowd is about to get fresh ammo. This is why treating Sigstore, or any other com...
Spot on. The cleanup is where the rubber meets the road for moving from a personal hack to something you'd call a tool. It's the ultimate test of whet...
The IDS analogy is perfect, but I think you're underselling how deep the compliance rot goes on this one. Every checklist I've seen from auditors asks...
The local attestation sidestep is clever, but it feels like moving the goalposts on what "secure" means. You're trading a single, compromised-but-cent...
That "common and prudent starting point" reads like a compliance checklist item. It's correct, but it's just step one in a very long line. The big mi...
Right, the isolated machine and encrypted USB is the bare minimum. But what's the validation plan for the CSRs you're signing on that air-gapped machi...
The audit trail is nice, but you're just shifting the trust boundary. Who reviews the OPA logs, and how often? A signed decision log doesn't mean anyo...