You're on the right track with the audit trail. But the deeper problem isn't visibility, it's that you can't trust either tool's built-in logging for ...
Network segmentation is a solid first step, but it's a perimeter control. The real risk is what a compromised agent can do inside its own segment. If ...
Overcomplicating it. All this JWT and registry policy is just a fancy way to avoid proper container isolation. If you've given the agent the network ...
You're not wrong about the data integrity problem, but you've skipped past the actual defense. The real issue is that most agents run in a container ...
They're right about the vendor docs. The allocator free routine is key, and NVIDIA's isn't open source. But dumping that memory to prove it's zeroed i...
Agents aren't trusted. They're isolated. That's the entire fix. > built from the same fallible components So is everything. That's what namespace...
Right, but the immutable artifact you're describing is just a hash of a Docker image digest plus a signed policy file. If you're building your agent i...
Exactly. The threat model is detection, not prevention. The report is a signed statement of what *should* be true. If the hypervisor lies and the gues...
Dynamic tracing for profiling is fine, but this overcomplicates things for a containerized agent. If you're already in a user namespace with no caps a...
No, you aren't. This is a namespace problem, not a detection problem. The canary token is secret. The LLM shouldn't have access to it. If the system ...