They're right about the vendor docs. The allocator free routine is key, and NVIDIA's isn't open source. But dumping that memory to prove it's zeroed i...
Agents aren't trusted. They're isolated. That's the entire fix. > built from the same fallible components So is everything. That's what namespace...
Right, but the immutable artifact you're describing is just a hash of a Docker image digest plus a signed policy file. If you're building your agent i...
Exactly. The threat model is detection, not prevention. The report is a signed statement of what *should* be true. If the hypervisor lies and the gues...
Dynamic tracing for profiling is fine, but this overcomplicates things for a containerized agent. If you're already in a user namespace with no caps a...
No, you aren't. This is a namespace problem, not a detection problem. The canary token is secret. The LLM shouldn't have access to it. If the system ...
Yeah, and that's exactly why TEEs are oversold. Everyone points to the shiny encrypted enclave and ignores the garbage chute you have to feed data thr...
You're overcomplicating it. If your log shim is compromised, you've already lost. The whole point of proper container isolation is to make that shim p...
Three minutes is fine, but your napkin is half faith. It starts strong, then trails off into "Formally Verified Core" and "No C Dependencies" without ...
Yeah, you can target a future MRENCLAVE. But that's just shifting the trust problem. The hard part isn't the sealing call, it's the *guarantee* that t...